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INVENTION AND BOUNDED LEARNING BY DOING
ABSTRACT
This paper presents a model of the interaction between
invention and learning by doing. Learning depends upon invention
in that learning by doing is viewed as the serendipitous
exploration of the finite productive potential of invented
technologies. At the same time, the profitability of costly
invention is dependent upon learning in that costs of production
depend upon the society's aggregate historical learning
experience. The resulting model is a true hybrid. With small
markets, the profitability of invention is low, and hence the
rate of invention becomes the constraining factor in growth.
With large markets, invention is very profitable and tends to
pull ahead of the society's learning experience. The consequent
growing gap between the technological frontier and the society's
industrial maturity squeezes returns, leading to an equilibrium
in which the rate of invention (and growth) is paced by the





Cambridge, MA 02139I INTRODUCTION
Modelsof endogenous technical change fall into two broad, and yet surprisingly disjoint,
categories. On the one hand, there are models of "invention" (e.g. Grossman and l-Ielpman 1989,
Romer 1990, Segerstrom et al. 1990), which view technical change as a costly and deliberative
process. On the other hand, there are models of "learning by doing" (e.g. Arrow 1962, Lucas
1988), which view technical change as the serendipitous outcome of goods production. Models
of invention generally focus on factors which influence the incentive to consciously innovate,
such as the institutional framework and market size,1 whereas models of learning focus on fac-
tors which influence the incentives to produce different types of goods, such as the pattern of
comparative advantage.2 This paper attempts to integrate these two literatures, developing a
model in which sustained technical progress involves an interaction between conscious decisions
(invention) and serendipitous outcomes (learning). This provides some preliminary insights into
the conditions under which either the incentives to innovate or the pattern of demand and pro-
duction are the binding constraints on growth.
Almost all learning by doing growth models assume that the potential productivity gains
from learning by doing are essentially unbounded.3 Careful reflection suggests, however, that
'See, for examples. Grossman and l-lelpman (1990), Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1989) and
Segcrstrom et al (1990).
2See Bardhan 1970, Lucas 1988, and Young 1991.
3The usual formulation involves a finite number of goods, with productivity in each indus-
try either a linear (e.g. Lucas 1988) or a log-linear (e.g. Arrow 1962, Bardhan 1970, Krugman
1987) function of cumulative production or investment experience, both of which imply that
experience alone can lead to unbounded productivity improvements. Young (1991) introduces a
bound on learning in each good, allowing for unbounded growth by taking as given the existence
of an infinite continuum of potentially producible goods. Bounds on learning have frequently
been introduced in partial equilibrium analyses, as in Fudenberg and Tirole (1983), Spence
(1981) and Stokey (1986).the potential for learning in theproductionof any particular good, using any particular process, is
in fact finite and bounded. When a new technical process is first invented, rapid learning occurs
as, by virtue of experience, the productive potential of that process is explored. After some time,
however, the inherent (physical) limit on the productivity of a technology will be approached and
learning will slow, and perhaps ultimately stop. In the absence of the introduction of new techni-
cal processes, it is unlikely that learning by doing can be sustained. This would explain why,
despite considerable economic activity, learning by doing did not lead to sustained economic
growth prior to the modern era.4
The dependence of sustained learning on a continued supply of new inventions does not
necessarily detract from the importance of modelling the learning process itself. To begin with,
empirical evidence suggests that the actualization of the productive potential of new technologies
(learning) may actually lead to productivity increases several orders of magnitude greater than
those associated with the original innovations themselves.5 Furthermore, the dynamics induced
Most of the empirical work on learning by doing (e.g. Wright 1936, Hirsch 1956, Alchian
1963, and Liebernian 1984) has focused on the log-linear model, where, typically, the cost of
production of the ntis unit is equal to a constant times cumulative output up to the nth unit raised
to a negative power (the progress elasticity), i.e. C=AE. This formulation clearly allows for
unbounded learning. Many of the early empirical studies of learning (e.g. Carr 1946, Asher
1956, Conway and Schultz 1959 and Baloff 1966) argued that learning was fundamentally
bounded. Although there has been no attempt to formally test whether learning is bounded or
unbounded, it is interesting to note that Levhari and Sheshinski (1973) did find that a formulation
in which the elasticity of output with respect to experience was a decreasing function of the level
of experience provided as good a fit as the usual log-linear model.
5Thtis, Enos (1958) found that whereas during the initial introduction of new petroleum
refining processes cost reductions of 1.5% per annum were achieved, subsequent improvements
of these same processes led to cost reductions of 4.5% per annum. Similarly, Mak and Walton
(1972) found that although the initial introduction of the steamboat, between 1815 and 1820, to
western inland rivers led to a signficant decline in freight costs, subsequent improvements in the
stcaiiiboat, principally incremental changes in hull design, led to much greater declines in ship-
ping costs between 1820 and 1860. For example, on the Louisville-New Orleans route upstream
rates per 100 lbs. fell from $5.00 in 1815 to $2.00 in 1820 to $0.25 in 1860 ($3.12 to $2.00 to
$0.28 in constant 1820 dollars).by learning, even if subsidiary to the process of invention, might, in particular problems, be of
interest. Most importantly, from the point of view of the theorist, is the fact that learning by
doing might have important feedbacks into the inventive process; perhaps by influencing both
the costs of invention and post-invention costs of production. In this paper I focus, in the main,
on the latter mechanism.
Clearly, a product's own production experience, combined with any benefits (i.e. technical
spillovers) it receives from learning by doing in other industries, will influence the time path of
that product's production Costs after it's invention. Furthermore, if one believes that there are
significant technical spillovers across industries,6 then it follows that aggregate social learning
should also influence a product's initial costs of production at the moment of invention. How
costly it is to produce a new product is at least partly dependent upon how much experience a
society has in producing similar products. By influencing both the initial and subsequent costs of
production of new inventions, learning by doing determines the profitability, and hence the rate,
of invention. Thus, just as sustained learning is dependent upon invention, so sustained inven-
tion might be dependent upon learning. The model of this paper attempts to capture this
dynamic interaction.
To outline the model, I begin by positing a society which at any point in time knows how
to produce a fixed set of goods. Each of these goods experiences bounded learning by doing.
The knowledge so generated is non-appropriable by firms and spills over across sectors, with, for
example, the knowledge acquired by a firm in industry A finding applications in industries B and
C. Entrepreneurs invent new goods, receiving an infinitely lived patent as compensation for their
'Rosenberg (1982) documents numerous historical examples of technical spillovers across
sectors, while Jaffe (1986) finds econometric evidence of R&D spillovers across technically sim-
ilar industries.
3efforts, and thereis free entry into the process of invention. Thus, despite the perfect spillovers
of(learnt) knowledge acrosssectors, finalgoods productiontakes place under conditions of
monopolistic competition.
To close the model. I introduce a specification for preferences in which no good is essen-
tial, but in which, for any given distribution of prices, demand is unitary income elastic. The fact
that no good is essential allows the model to incorporate a rich narrative structure, capturing both
the qualitative and the quantitative dimensions of growth. Over time, the society will produce a
changing basket of goods, with new goods replacing old obsolete goods and with the quantities
consumed, of the new substitutes, rising. For their part, the unitary income elasticities make the
analysis of intertemporal consumption smoothing quite tractable. In sum, the model of this paper
encompasses invention, bounded learning by doing with spillovers across goods, old goods
obsolescence, and non-trivial intertemporal decision-making.
As we shalt see, the model behaves like a true hybrid. With small markets, the profitability
of invention is low, and hence the rate of invention becomes the constraining factor in growth,
with the parameter governing the rate of learning having no effect. With large markets, inven-
tion is very profitable and and tends to pull ahead of the society's learning experience. Since
profits depend upon production costs which in turn depend upon social learning, this growing
gap between the technological frontier and the society's industrial maturity squeezes returns,
leading to an equilibrium with the rate of invention (and growth) paced by the society's rate of
learning. There exist equilibria in which the process of invention becomes largely irrelevant, in
the sense that a subsidy to invention would have no effect on the economy's steady state growth
rate.
Section 11 presents the basic structure of the model. Section III discusses some of the Criti-
cal assumptions. Sections IV nd V develop the instantaneous and intertemporal aspects of the
4general equilibiium. Section VI analyzes the steady state and section VII concludes.
5H A MODEL OF INVENTION ANDLEARNING
Imaginethat all of the goods that have ever been or ever will be invented can be arranged,
in order of increasing technical sophistication, along the real line. At any point in time, however,
a society will only know how to produce a subset of this real line, goods in [O,N(t)], where N(t)
naturally denotes the most sophisticated good the society is currently able to produce.7 Labour is
the sole factor of production, and the function a(s,t) describes the amount of labour necessary to
produce one unit of goods at time t.8 This economy experiences bounded learning by doing with
spillovers across goods. Thus, the unit labour requirements function is given by:
(1)a(s,f)=ie' VS[O,T(t)}a(s,t) =e_Te_T()V s E [T(t),N(r)]




where v denotes the rate at which each worker learns.
Equations (1) and (2) are a specific functional form of a more general learning by doing
technology outlined in Young (1991). Learning is bounded in that the amount of labour required
to produce good s, a(s,t), cannot fall below e'. Since all goods enter symmetrically into utility
(see below), the fact that this lower bound is downward sloping reflects the notion that the ulti-
mate productivity of labour (in units of utility) is increasing in the technical sophistication of the
7Throughout this paper, the notation with respect with time denotes an implicit, rather than
explicit, dependence that emerges from the general equilibrium behavior of the various economic
actors. Superscripted dots will denote time derivatives.
a(s,t) is defined only on the domain [O,N(t)].
6production processes involved.9 There are spillovers in learning across goods, with technical
improvements originating in any particular industry s having applications in other industries.
This is encompassed in the formulation for t(t), which essentially implies that these spillovers
are symmetric across all sectors.'° Once an industry has reached its lower bound, e',thereis
nothing left to learn in that industry, and thus further experience in the production of that good
cannot contribute to productivity increases in the rest of the economy. Hence, the economy-wide
learning by doing equation (2) only includes the labour devoted to the production of goods in
which learning has yet to be exhausted.'t Given the symmetrical nature of learning by doing
spillovers, learning is exhausted sequentially in goods and T(t). the most recent good to reach the
lower bound we',constitutesa state variable which summarizes the society's cumulative learn-
ing experience.12
New goods are invented through the creative efforts of entrepreneurs/firms, who acquire an
9One could, equivalently, scale units so that the lower bound on unit labour requirements
is increasing in s, but with higher numbered goods providing greater utility per unit. A practical
example might be the replacement of the phonograph by the compact disc player. Although
compact disc players are more expensive than phonographs, they provide greater utility per unit
cost, and hence are replacing the older system.
'°
Equation(2) also implies that the contribution of an industry's own output to improve-
ments in its productivity is of zero measure relative to the effect of learning spillovers from other
sectors. Complicating the model to allow for own industry effects that are of positive measure
relative to economy-wide spillovers would not, I believe, significantly change the results high-
lighted in this paper.
"Thus, as in the typical learning by doing model, there is a constant rate of learning, jt,
butonly until such time as the industry has exhausted its potential stock of knowledge.
'2As can be seen from (2), many different historical production paths could lead to the
same T(t).
7infinitely lived patent on each good they invent. The rate of invention is linear in the aggregate
amount of labour devoted to reseaich:
(3) N(t)=LRIaR
and there is free entry into the inventive process. Firms finance their R&D efforts by selling
shares, which are traded in a capital market. After a good is invented, the firm owning the patent
will engage in monopolistic competition with all other patent holders, distributing any profits to
its shareholders.'3
In this economy there are L representative consumers, each of whom inelastically supplies
one unit of labour at all times t and seeks to maximize the present discounted value of the loga-
rithm of a time separable utility functional:
(4)Max r=je'Thog(U{C(.,v)})dv
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint:
(5) E(v)dv =A (1) + Je' w(v) dv
whereR(t) denotes the cumulative interest factor up to time t and w(t) and A(t) denote the nomi-
nal wage and individual assets at time t. E(t), instantaneous consumer expenditure, equals:
N(s)
(6) E(t)=j' p(s,t)C(s,t)ds
' Equation (3) does not allow for any feedback from theprocess of learning into the actual
costs of invention. This could easily be modified, say by making N(z) = 1(N(t) — T(t))LRIaR, with
l'(.) <0, /(0) = 1. This formulation would posit that the costs of further innovation are lower the
more fully a society has explored its existing technical capabilities. As it adds additional com-
plexity, without changing the results in any meaningful way, I do not incorporate this notion into
the model.
8with p(.,t) and C(.,t) describing goods prices and individual consumption along [0,N(t)]. The
utility functional, U(C(.,t)), is given by:"




and where g(.) is strictly concave and continuously differentiable, with:
(9) g(0)=0, g'(O)<c's
Forthepurposes of this paper, it is necessary to pick a particular functional form for g(.), and to
that end Ichoosethe quadratic:"
(10)
Clearly, the presence of II C(t) in g(.) ensures that, for any given p(.,t) function, consumer
'4Preferences are actually defined over all current and future goods along the real line,
[0,oo). Since at any point in time t, consumption of any good x>N(t), which has yet to be
invented, is trivially zero, for ease of exposition I restrict the upper bound on the integral to N(t).
"None of the results of this paper are dependent upon the choice of the quadratic func-
tional form, which simply eases the analysis. Since g(.) embodies the consumer's desire for vari-
ety, the quadratic implies that the consumer could derive disutility from concentrating
consumption on a small set of goods. Examples readily come to mind. Imagine that all of one's
nutritional needs are satisfied and that only the varieties of food one will consume remain to be
chosen. Clearly, if one were forced to eat only one kind of food for each and every meal, one
would soon derive considerable disutility from the actual act of consuming that food.
9demand foreach good sis unit income elastic.'6 At the same time, the concavity of g(.),
combined with the restriction on g'(O), indicates a strong,butnot unbounded, preference for
variety. Changes in p(.,t) will lead to changes in the Set of goods consumed, with, over time,
new and more advanced goods replacing older more primitive goods. Thus, these preferences
retain a rich structure, whilst remaining tractable enough to handle non-trivial intertemporal opti-
'6One can see that if one multiplies the consumption of each good s by a constant X, the
marginal utilities (g') do not change. The notion of these type of preferences is borrowed from
Wan (1975), who, however, does not seem to have considered the fact that the consumer must
take into account the effect of C(s,t) on CN in picking an optimal consumption basket (see
appendix 1 further below).
17examples ofsimilartypes ofpreferenceswithout unitary income elasticities, see
Stokey (1988 and 1990)andYoung(1991).Despite the non-unitary income elasticities, Stokey
(1990) handily solves the consumer's intertemporal maximization problem in the steady state.
10III DISCUSSION OF THE MODEL
Readers familiar withmodelsof endogenous growthbasedupon innovation, e.g. Romer
1990andGrossman and Helpman 1990, are probably aware that the usual formulation for the
rate of invention is of the form: N(t)= N(t)LR/aR. Thisimplies powerful spillovers in know!-
edge, with the absolute productivity of inventors rising in the society's degree of development.
Although this assumption may or may not be empirically valid, it is important to recognize the
technical role it plays in those models. Without old goods obsolescence, the potential profitabil-
ity of new inventions is inversely related to the existing number of competitive products. To sus-
tain steady state innovation, it is necessary to have the cost of innovation inversely related to the
existing number of products as well. With old goods obsolescence, as will occur in the model of
this paper, the existing number of obsolete products, such as oil lamps and rickshaws, is not rele-
vant to determining the profitability of the next invention. Thus, I can specify a somewhat
weaker form of spillovers. Although patents protect innovators from immitative production, they
do not prevent other entrepreneurs from examining new products and learning their technical
qualities. Using this information, entrepreneurs are able to invent the next generation of
improved products (N(:)+ c),which have, ultimately, greater productive potential, as given by
the lower bound on unit labour requirements,
Fromthe above, it should be apparent that the distinction between learning and invention is
not that the former involves technical spillovers, whilst the latter does not. In the model of this
paper, both activities create positive externalities which are not captured by those responsible for
generating the new knowledge. 11e crucial distinction is that learning generates knowledge as a
this respect, the model is quite similar to the quality ladders models of Grossman and
Helpman (1989) and Segerstrom, Anant and Dinopoulos (1990) in which each new generation of
products involves a constant percentage improvement in quality over the previous generation,
with the cost of invention unaffected by the existing number of inventions.
11costless by-pmduct of other activities, whereas invention involves costly investigation.
Although the Technologies generated by learning by doing might be appropriable and could give
rise to conscious attempts to move down learning curves," this is not a necessary condition for
technical change to occur in a learning model. Whether or not the benefits are appropriable, ser-
endipitous learning by doing will give rise to sustained technical progress. In contrast, given that
it is costly, at least some of the benefits of invention must be directly appropriable by the
inventor for technical progress to occur. Table I below summarizes these distinctions.
"As in Spence 1981.
12TABLE 1: DISTINCTIONS
Learning by Doing Invention
Costly: No Yes
Spillovers: Yes Yes
Appropriable: No, but could be. Yes, and must be.
In this paper I assume that the benefits of learning are non-appropriable, whereas inventive
activity is compensatedwiththe award of infinitely lived patents. From these assumptions
follow the principal results of the model. When markets are small, the effective compensation
given to inventors is too small and the economy stagnates, as invention becomes the constraining
factor in growth. A small subsidy to invention would improve social welfare. When markets are
large, the infinitely lived patent provides an excessively large reward to inventive activity.
Invention races ahead of the society's current rate of learning, and growth becomes constrained,
and paced, by the rate of learning. In this case, a tax on invention, releasing resources for
production, would actually improve social welfare. In a model in which two activities are
necessary for growth, but only one is compensated, there can easily be excessive activity in the
compensated sector, even though that sector generates positive externalities.
13IV INSTANTANEOUS EQUILIBRIUM
Ibeginwiththe analysis of the instantaneousequilibrium at each time t. Let w(t),the
nominal wage, be thenumeraire.Thus, the flow of each consumer's labour income equals 1 and
all prices and values are denominated in units of labour. To simplify the notation, in what fol-
lows I shall frequently suppress the notation denoting the implicit dependence of the variables on
time.
Given the time separability of the consumer's utility function, the consumer's optimal con-
sumption and expenditure programme can be broken down into a two stage analysis: first maxi-
mizing instantaneous utility subject to instantaneous expenditure, and then, with U(C(.,t))
defined as a function of E(t) and p(.,t), maximizing total intertemporal utility subject to the
intertemporal budget constraint. With respect to the maximization of the instantaneous utility
functional, U(C(.)}, the solution to this problem is best understood by characterizing C(s)/I' C
as a consumption density f(s). which integrates to 1. The consumers problem is to allocate this
consumption density across goods and then adjust the consumption sealing factor ( C) based
upon the desired level of instantaneous expenditure, i.e.:
N(,)




Sinceall goods enter symmetrically into her utility, the consumer will naturally choose to
consume the cheapest goods. If the consumer consumes any good z, she will consume all goods
14s cheaperthanz.Giventhat the consumer has a bounded desire for variety, it follows20 that there
existssomelimit good Zsuch that the consumer consumes allgoodswhich arecheaper than Z,
andconsumes no goodswhichare more expensive than Z. The density of consumption allocated
to each good s (cheaper than Z) should, intuitively, depend in some fashion on the difference
between the price of good Z and the price of good s. As it so happens, with quadratic utility this
dependence is linear, with the optimal f(s) being given by:2'
(14) f(s)=?4p(Z)—p(s)]
where X is the marginal utility derived from an additional unit of expenditure, E, at the consumer
optimum. Good Z is determined by the requirement that the integral of the consumption density,
f(s), equal 1(12). The consumer's budget constraint (13) then determines the consumption
scaling factor, CII.
Since the output of each individual firm (of measure zero on the real line) makes no
significant contribution to economy-wide learning, the current behavior of any particular firm
does not influence its future profitability, and hence all firms find it optimal to maximize current
profits:
(15) Max it(s)=C(s)L [p(s)—a(s)] =II CLf(s) [p(s)—a(s)]
P(,)
From which it follows that the equilibrium price of each good s is given by?
20Given sufficient variability in goods prices. If all goods shared the same equilibrium
price, the consumer would obviously choose to consume them all.
2 Appendix 1 explores the technical aspects of the consumer's optimization problem.
22 the individual firm is of insignificant measure on the real line,




The instantaneous equilibrium is illustratedinfigure 1(a). Consumer's consume a range of
goods t= T—Zand 1 =N—Ton either side ofT. Given the unitary income elasticities, c is
invariant with respect to T and E and is determined by 1 alone.n An increase in fl leads to
substitution away from goods below T (drJdl<0),with the total variety (t+1) of goods
consumed increasing. Not surprisingly, the consumption scaling factor Cl is linear in E/e_T.
Finally,firms charge a price equal to the average of their marginal cost of production and the
price of the limit consumption good, good Z.
In drawing figure 1(a), I have assumed that T is sufficiently large so that good 0 is no
longer consumed. I have also assumed that 1 is not too large, in the following sense: If 1 is
larger than some critical value 11, then, as illustrated in figure 1(b), consumption is symmetric
around T and the most recently invented goods, in [T +1N], are not consumed. Although the
blueprints to produce these goods exist, their Costs of production have not yet fallen to a level
where they can be profitably marketed. This is a case where basic research has outstripped
economy-wide learning, producing inventions which are not immediately profitable.
As can be seen from figure 1, the position of a firm relative to the society's current level of
learning ('F) affects that firm's markup. Finns which are either near obsolescence (near Z) or on
the cutting edge of the society's technology (near N) have lower markups than firms which have
just attained maturity (i.e. are near 'I). This result is due to the fact that the society's cost
structure, normalized to units of symmetric utility, is v shaped. If, instead, utility adjusted costs
23See appendix 1. In Young (1991), where demand is not unit elastic, the variety of goods








a) (b)of production were monotonically decreasing, then markups would be monotonically increas-
ingin the technicalsophisticationof theindustry. An allowance forafinite patent length as well
as durability in consumption would both tend to introduce some monotonicity in markups in
favour of recent inventions.
Given the pattern of consumer expenditure determined by (14) and(16),it is possible to
compute the (consumer) price of a unit of instantaneous utility, U((C(.,t))):
(17)P0 =en[(c+r1)e+2_e_ef]/2
Whereasthe actual (labour) costofproducingthisunit of utility is:
(18) MCU





It is easily verified that this markup is decreasing in 11,27notonly because, as discussed above,
firms on the technological edge have lower markups, but also because an increase in 1 implies
an equalization of the structure of prices facing consumers, thereby increasing the elasticity of
Forexamp1e, 1eta(s,t)=e'VsE[O,T] E [T,N], where
—1 <y<O.
Once again, see appendix 1 for computational details.
If 11 11. substitute 'fortand 11 in equations (l7)-(19).
27For 11 <r. For 11 ￿ ri', it is invariant with respect to 11.
17demand, and driving down the markups of all firms in the economy. This result would hold
even if the markup were monotonically increasing in s. The vei' fact that firms to the right of T
are above their lower bound on unit costs, whilst firms to the left of T are on their lower bound,
implies that an increase in i will tend to equalize the cost and price structure of the economy,
providing consumers with more symmetric alternatives, and thereby increasing the elasticity of
demand.
Finally, labour market equilibrium requires that the demand for labour in manufacturing
(Lv) and research (La) equal the total supply:
(2O) LM+LA=L
Notsurprisingly, the amount of labour in final goods production depends upon consumer expen-
diture and the economy-wide markup over costs:
(EL EL
(21)





(23) h(rl)=ee e ￿1/2h'(rl)>O 2+e—4e +2e e —e
This is due to the fact that no good is essential in consumption.
h (11) = h (2f) = I /2 when i ￿ ii'. since, in that case, demand is distributed symmetrically
across learning and non-learning industries (examine figure 1(b)).
18V INTERTEMPORAL EQUILIBRIUM
Havingderived the equilibrium price of a unit of utility, we can consider the consumer's
dynamic optimization problem as one of picking an expenditure pian,E(t),so as to maximize:
(24) P= 5 e'{log[E(v)] —log[P0(v)]} dv
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint (5) earlier above. This leads to the familiar opti-




Turning to the behavior of firms, let V(s,t) equal the asset market value of holding the
patent to good s at time t:
(26) V(s,t)=je')*"7t(s,v) dv
where ic(s,t)denotesthe profits of firm sat time t. Differentiating (26) with respect to time
yields an expression for the interest rate:
(27) Vs
which simply states that, in this deterministic environment, asset market equilibrium requires that
the return to holding the patent to any good s (profits plus patent value appreciation) must equal
19the risk free rate of return. Free entry into the inventive process willensurethat the present
discounted value of the profits of firm N(t) will be less than or equal to the cost of invention:30
(28) a ￿ V(N(t),t) = 5 e'>7t(N(t),v)dv(= if11(t) >0)
Assuming that !'(t) > 0 and thus (28) holds with equality,wecan differentiate to derive an




ic(N(ii, I) —t1(t)V1(N (t),t)
a0
Figure2 helps explain equilibrium condition (29). At any point in time, the value of each
firm depends upon its position along the real line. Finns sZ(t) have a value of zero, since, as
demand has moved to the right, they will never again earn any profits.33 Free entry into the
inventive process ensures that V(N(t),t)=a0. Thus, we know there exists a differentiable curve
30Consider, by devoting labour 'k to invention for an infinitesimally small period of time
dt, a firm can, at cost !5dt, acquire patents to goods in (N(t),N(t)+/Rdt/a,5], which, again for infini-
tesimally small dt, have value V(N(t),t)l0dtJa0. With free entry, profits in the process of inven-
tion are driven to zero, and hence, a0=V(N(t),t).
If fi = 0, then L5=0 and the equilibrium interest rate can be detennined by differentiating
(21) with respect to time and applying (25).
32The subscripted 1 denotes the derivative with respect to the first argument of the func-
tion.
33lncreases in either T or N move Z to the right. Hence, once a firm s has become Z(t),
there will never again be any demand for its product.
Examine (26), (15), (16) and (14).
20FIGURE 2: MARKET VALUE OF FIRM S
,V)describing V(s,t) linking ihe coordinates (Z(t),O) and (N(t),a,),asdrawn in the figure. This curve
need not be monotonic, nor is it stationary through time. Comparing (27) and (29), we see that
we need to show that V2(N(:), I) = —!'Q)V1(N(t),t).At time t, the value of firm N(t), V(N(t),t),
equals aR. However, at that same time t, firm N(t) is, as a result of invention, being pushed to the
left in figure 2 (since some other firm is becoming N(t+dt)). The rate of change of the value of
fnm N(t), V2(N(t),t), depends upon the derivative of the V(s,t) function at the point N(t),
V1(N(t),t), times the rate at which firm N(t) is being pushed to the left, tl(t). Hence,
V2(N(t),:) =—)'1(t)V1(N(t),:),whichexplains (29).
To summarize, consumers, maximizing current utility subject to current expenditure,
choose a distribution of expenditure across goods which depends only on 11(t)=N(t)-T(t), as
illustrated in figure 1, with the density of expenditure given by (14). Maximizing intertemporal
utility, consumers find it optimal to set the growth rate of expenditure equal to the interest rate
minus their rate of time discount (25). Existing firms, competing monopolistically, find it opti-
mal to set their current price as the average of the price of the limit consumption good, Z(t), and
their costs of production (16). Free entry into invention, combined with asset market
equilibrium, determines the interest rate as a function of the profits of the most advanced firm
(N(t)) and the rate of change of the value of that firm (29). The current level of consumer
expenditure, as well as the economy's current structure (as given by 11(t)), determines the amount
of labour allocated to industries in which learning continues and industries in which learning has
been exhausted (21-22). Labour market clearing requires that this labour, plus the labour allo-
cated to research, equal the total labour force (20). Given these relations, the intertemporal
equilibrium then consists of dynamic paths for T(t), Tl(t) and E(t) which satisfy equations (2), (3)
and (5).
21VI STEADY STATE BEHAVIOR
Inthe steady state, E and i must be constant. This implies that the real rate of interest (k)
equalsthe rate of time discount (p), and that the rate of invention (iS') equals the rate of learning
(h. Using the labour market clearing condition (20) and the free entry condition (28) this deter-
mines E and r as functions of the parameters L, , aR and p. With a constant steady state level
of expenditure, E, and a steadily declining price of a unit of U{ C(.)),
P0 = + ri)e + 2— e — e]/2, the proportional rate of growth of U is equal to the equilib-
rium rate of learning (and invention), 1' =N, which! shall call g.35
Before turning to a general analysis of the steady state, it is useful to examine two extreme
types of equilibria. This model, as in the invention models of Romer (1990) and Grossman and
Helpman (1989), allows for a stagnant steady state, with zero growth. In that case,
= = iS' = 0, and all of the firms in (Z,T} earn an infinitely lived stream of Constant profits.
This will constitute an equilibrium if and only if the present discounted value of the profits of
finn T are less than or equal to the cost of invention, which leads to the following condition:
(30) a5￿L/p
In this model, L represents the effective size of the market over which firms can recoup the costs
of invention. Condition (30) states that if this market is small enough, or the cost of invention
(a5) or the steady state rate of interest (p) are large enough, the economy will stagnate.37 Inter-
ttSince instantaneous utility is actually the log of U, for p >0 total intertemporal utility
will always be bounded, regardless of how large g is.
361f they were greater than the cost of invention, then economic actors would find it profit-
able to invent products infinitesimally to the right of T.
ttOne can interpret (30) as saying that the annuity value of the cost of invention (paR) must
be greater titan or equal to the instantaneous profits of firm T (which just so happen to equal L).
22estingly, the rate of labour learning. ti,, has no effect on the existence of this equilibrium; for
there must be at least some minimal level of invention for learning to occur and have an impact
on growth. This contrasts with the typical learning by doing model, in which there is always
some growth (even at small scales of production) and in which the rate of growth is always
strictly increasing in the rate of learning. Thus, for small market sizes this model behaves
exactly like an endogenous growth model based solely upon invention (with no modelling of
learning).
For L, p, and aR such that (30) does not hold, the steady state growth rate is positive, with
i >0. An increase in LIaR raises the relative profitability of invention, leading to an endogenous
increase in TI, which lowers markups, squeezes profitability and reestablishes equilibrium. For
large enough L or small enough a, the steady state equilibrium fl exceeds II' (recall figure Ib).
In this case, potential profits are so large (relative to the cost of invention) that firms find it opti-
mal to invent products before these are even marketable, holding the patents until aggregate pro-
duction experience brings their costs of production down to acceptablelevels. The rate of
growth is then given by:
(31) g=2 +
Although both the cost of invention and the learning parameter influence the rate of growth, it is
apparent that, in this equilibrium, the growth rate is independent of the overall process of inven-
tion. For example, a subsidy to invention (lowering the effective cost to inventors) would only
increase i, without influencing the steady state growth rate in any way. Thus, for large values
of the scale parameter, L, this model behaves like a simple learning by doing model with a con-
In fact, during the transition dynamics, in which TI increases, it would actually lower the
growth rate by drawing labour out of the learning sector.
23stant learning parameter leadingtounboundedgrowth, in whichone can, for all intents and
purposes, ignore the process of invention.
These two extreme equilibria, inventive stagnation andlearningconstrained growth, illus-
trate the mechanisms at work in this model. Although there are two activities necessary for sus-
tained growth, learning and invention, only the latter is compensated (by the award of the
infinitely lived patent). For small markets the reward given to entrepreneurs is too small to
induce them to undertake inventive activities. It is easily shown that for L=PoR a small subsidy
to invention, leading to positive inventive activity, would lead to an improvement in social wel-
fare. For large markets, the reward given to inventors is too large, leading to the production of
inventions which are (temporarily) of no social benefit. Given a positive rate of time discount,
the society would like to see resources temporarily withdrawn from invention and allocated to
the uncompensated growth activity (learning). Thus, a tax on inventive activities would improve
social welfare. Perhaps the most obvious lesson of this model is that when two activities are
jointly necessary for growth, but only one is compensated, then, despite the fact that the compen-
sated activity generates positive externalities which are not captured by private actors, it is still
possible that, from a social point of view, too many resources are devoted to that activity.
Outside of these two types of equilibria, the steady state growth rate is positive, with
if> r >0. The detemiination of the equilibrium growth rate can be analyzed with some simple
graphical tools. One can think of this economy as having two sectors, a final (consumption)
goods sector and an invention (growth) goods Sector. Using the equation:
(PPF)L+ga5=L
39Equalto wI(2 + va5).
24one candrawa productionpossibilities frontier illustratingthe potential tradeoffs between the
size of the final goods sector (as measured by LM) andtherate of invention, g (figure 3a).
Clearly, a rise in L shifts the curve out, whilst an increase in aR rotates it clockwise.
In the steady state the rate of learning must equal the rate of invention. This "balanced
growth" relation can be written as:
(BG)h(rl)LM=g
which, for given T, can be drawn as a ray emanating from the origin. As i increases, a greater
proportion of any manufacturing labour force is allocated to learning industries (h'>O), and thus
the curve rotates clockwise, reaching the limiting locus WLM/2gfor T ￿ r. An increase in y
rotates the BG curve clockwise.
Finally, free entry into invention defines a factor market equilibrium relation, which states
that the return on devoting a unit of labour to invention, i.e. V(N(t),t)/aR, must be less than or
equal to the real return to labour in manufacturing. i.e. 1:
(FME)1 ￿ V(N(t),t)/aR
Itis easily shown that V(N(t),t) depends upon the steady state size of the final goods market, as
measured by LM, and lifetime profits per unit of market size, which depend upon TI, p and g:
(32) V(N(,),t) =LT(fl,p,g)
-Arise in LM,forgiven 1, p and g, will raise the value of finn N(t). The partial effect of an
increase in the steady state rate of invention and learning, g, is more ambiguous. With a more
rapid rate of learning, firms find that the society's production basket is moving to the right more
rapidly, thus the firm transits more quickly from being firm N(t) at time t, to being firm T(t') at
time t', to being firm Z(C) at time C.Asa finn goes from being N(t) to T(t') its profitability rises
40For details, see appendix 2.






-1 471-(see figure earlier), but its profitability falls as it transits from T(t') to Z(t'). In addition,
although a more rapid rate of aggregate learning puts a firm in a more desirable state (T(t')) at an
earlier date, the more rapid rate of transit also ensures that the firm will spend less time in each
such state and ultimately move on to less desirable states. Whether the net effect is positive or
negative depends upon the distance between N and T (TI),aswell as the discount rate p.4' Thus,
in (g,L) space the factor market equilibrium relation may slope upwards or downwards.42 An
increase in either TI. p or a will, for any given market size and rate of growth, lower the relative
profitability of invention, shifting the entire FME curve up.
The steady state size of the final goods market LM, rate of learning and invention g, and
level of iaredetermined by the joint intersection of these three curves.43" For example, con-
sider an expansion in the resource base, L (figure 3b). At the original growth rate g, invention is
now more profitable, leading to a surge in inventive activity which outpaces the rate of learning,
increasing TI. As TI rises, the balanced growth equation rotates down (more of any given man-
ufacturing labour force is allocated to learning industries) and the factor market equilibrium rela-
For example, for a discount rate of zero, the net effect is always negative, since there is
no benefit to arriving at a more favourable state earlier in time, but the higher rate of transit
ensures that the time spent in each state is shorter. Similarly, as TI goes to zero, the net effect
becomes negative, since, along (Z,T], the firm finds itself moving more rapidly into less profit-
able states. For large p and large TI however, it can be shown that the net effect is unambigously
positive.
42Although the FME curve is always flatter than the BG curve, it may, when negatively
sloped, be either more or less steep than the PPF.
additional appendix, available upon request from the author, proves the existence of a
unique solution, as well as showing that the FME curve is flatter than the BG curve and that the
FMEcurvemay be steeper than the PPF.
"I have focused my analysis on LM. rather than E, since the steady state value of the latter
depends upon the overall markup and is therefore harder to interpret. Using (21), LM and TI
jointly determine the steady state value of E.
26tion shifts upwards (lower return to invention requiring an increase in market size), establishing a
new equilbrium with, relative to the original steady state, increased levels of L,f, g and TI.
Alternatively, an increase in p will shift the FME curve up (figure 3c). As invention becomes
less profitable, the rate of learning will begin to outstrip the rate of invention, leading to a drop in
11. Consequently, the FME curve will shift back down, and the BG curve rotate up, reestablish-
ing a steady state equilibrium with a larger manufacturing labour force (L,,.) and lower levels of
fl and g.
Using similar graphical analyses, it is possible to derive the following results:45
(33)g/L >0 ag/&z, <0 agii>0 ag/ap <0
LMfL>0 aLM/aaRo46 aLMfaf<o aLM/aP>o
an,aL>0 JTlIJa5<0iao47 aiap<o
45Thegraphical analysis becomes somewhat more complicated when the downward slop-
ing FME curve is steeper than the PPF. In that case, an increase in TI moves both the FME and
BG curves to the right. It can be shown, however, that the FME curve always moves further
along the PPF than the BG curve. Thus, for example, in the case of an increase in p analyzed in
figure 3c, if the FME curve were steeper than the PPF, then the initial upward shift in the FME
curve would put its intersection with the PPF to the right of that of the BC curve. A fall inn'
however, would move the FME curve to the left (along the PPF) faster than it would the BG
curve, reestablishing a three way intersection at a lower level of TI.
46The ambiguous effect of a5 on LM follows from the fact that whereas when TI is near zero
an increase in a increases LM (by shutting down all invention), when 11 >anincrease in a5
lowers LM (by drawing labour Out of manufacturing into invention).
47A rise in iiincreasesthe effective labour force, releasing labour from manufacturing for
use in research. Whereas the contraction in LM lowers firm profitability, implying the need to
lower i,thepartial effect of an increase in g is ambiguous. If the FME curve is steeper than the
PPF (implying that the partial effect of g is strongly positive), the net effect of increasing g and
lowering LM is to raise firm profitability, necessitating a rise in .Hencethe ambiguous effect of
an increase in N' on 11.
27The results are not surprising: economies endowed with more effective units of the factor
used intensively in the growth process grow faster. Consequently, increases in L or reductions in
a increase the steady State growth rate. Similarly, an increase in v raises the rate of learning,
increasing the effective resource base available for use in balanced growth.
Finally, it is interesting to note that this model has implications for the relationship
between growth rates and the share of rents in national income. Presumably, most economies
face the same underlying technical opportunities, i.e. have similar aR's and w's, but vary in their
resource base, L. An increase in L leads to a steady state rise in , lowering the economy wide
markup. Consequently, economies which grow faster will tend to have lower markups and, thus,
a lower share of rents in national income. It is a common belief that in slow growth economies
a larger proportion of income is derived from rents, with the usual explanation focusing on the
perceived detrimental effects of rent seeking on growth. The model of this paper suggests that
the direction of causality might in fact be the reverse. In economies with low growth rates,
holders of privilege reap large rents because there are few emerging competitors. If the economy
were growing faster, then, even though each new entrant also acquired privilege, the intensified
competition could lower the overall proportion of rents in national income. If one wants to argue
that rent seeking reduces growth rates, the argument should perhaps rest, not on the detrimental
Total profit income (TPI) equals total sales times profits per sale:
TPI=(Pa, — MG11) = ELm
(Ti) —1
Pu m()




The share of rents in national income equals TPI/(L+TPI), which is clearly homogeneous of
degree zero in L. As m'(Ti) <0 and h'(Ti) >0, it follows that an increase in Ti brought about by an
increase in L will lower the share of rents in national income.
28effects of rent seeking per se, but rather on the attempts by existing rentiers to bar other
claimants to government decreed privilege. Thus, rent seeking by economic actors in a fairly
open political system, such as that of the United States, need not have detrimental effects on
growth, and might, in fact, encourage growth by allowing innovators to reap rewards greater than
those that could be achieved under a free market system.49
49The positive welfare effects of granting innovators temporary monopolies are cleanly
illustrated in Krugman (1988).
29VII CONCLUSION
Ifone truly believed most simple unbounded learning by doing models, one would be at a
loss to explain the prolonged periods of stagnation experienced by all economies prior to the
modern era. Instead, history seems to suggest that in any given environment there really is only
a finite amount of knowledge that can be acquired serendipitously, without conscious effort or
cost. Thus, a realistic model of growth must address the incentives for the conscious and costly
invention of new goods and production processes. At the same time, learning by doing appears
to be a genuine empirical phenomenon which not only leads to enormous improvements of exis-
ting technologies but also, one would imagine, must influence the incentives for further inven-
tion. Thus, there seems to be a dynamic interaction between learning and invention which is
worth exploring both theoretically and empirically.
To this end, this paper has presented a formal model of the interaction between invention
and learning. Learning depends upon invention in that learning is viewed as the serendipitous
exploration of the finite productive potential of invented technologies. At the same time, the
profitability of costly invention is dependent upon learning in that costs of production depend
upon the society's aggregate historical learning experience. The resulting model is a true hybrid.
With small markets, the profitability of invention is low, and hence the rate of invention becomes
the constraining factor in growth, with the learning parameter having little or no effect. With
large markets, invention is extremely profitable and the constraining influence becomes the rate
of learning, which in turn depends upon the pattern of consumer demand.
These results are suggestive of the types of issues the different types of endogenous growth
models might most appropriately address. For the analysis of the early stages of the industrial
revolution, models of invention, with their emphasis on minimum market size and the incentives
for costly invention, would seem to be most appropriate. In the case of the analysis of the inter-
30action of modem trading economies, although it is undoubtably true that the generation and
international transmission of inventions is of substantial import, given the far less constraining
influence of market size it would also seem that the insights into the detrimental effects of static
I,
comparative advantage provided by rather simple unbounded learning by doing models might
not be without merit.
31VIII A1'PENIMX 1: CONSUMER'S OPTIMIZATION PROBLEM
Thisappendix presents some of the mathematical details of the consumer's optimization
problem and the instantaneous equilibrium. Combining (1 1)-(13), one can form the Lagrangian:
N(,) N(s) N(')
(1.1) L=fjCIIg(f(s))ds+ ).[E_f lCp(s)f(s)ds] + [lcl —flCf(s)ds]







Since asp(s) — p (Z) from below, f(s) —* 0, it follows, from (1.2), that = I — ).p (Z).
Substituting back into (1.2) yields equation (14) in the text, which holds for all goods s such that
p(s)￿p(Z).
Substituting (14) and (16) from the text into (1.3)-(1.5), and integrating:
(1.3)'1 = (?c_T/2)[(r+1)eI+2_e_e1t]
(1.4)' E=(fl C X2e_2nI4) [e2'(t+l) + I — e2'/2—e2'V2]
50Concavityof g(.) ensures concavity of the integrand in f(s). Thus the inequality con-
strained Euler equation (1.2) is both necessaty and sufficient for a path f(s) to maximize (1.1).
Taking the optimal f(s) as given, since the Lagrangian is negative semidefinite in C, and ,
the first onler conditions (1 .3)-(1 .5) are necessary and sufficient for an optimum; where (1) I
treat the problem as one of unconstrained optimization, since (1.4) will ensure that I Cl is non-
negative; and (2) the envelope theorem ensures that the partial of f(s) with respect to Cl,and
X does not appear in these first order conditions.
32(1.5)' XE =ICI[1 —XeTe'f2]+XE/2
where c =T—ZandTI = N—T.Theseequationsallow for solutions for X, I CJ and tasfunc-
tions of the state variables E, Tl,ande_T.t isdetermined as an implicit function of alone by:
(1.6)t,TI)=2l(t+TIe+2—e'—e'I[(t+TI)e+2—2e'—e"J—e'(.t+1l)_1 +e'12+e"I2=O
It is easily seen that for <ri', if a =0,4 determines a unique t>if>i,with




Examining (1.1), it is readily apparent that X' is the price of a unit of utility at the con-
sumer optimum, which is the origin of equation (17) in the text. Define Cu,asthe I Cl neces-
sary to enjoy one unit of utility at the consumer optimum. This is easily determined using
U{C(.)} =XE=1and (1.5)'. Then, the total labour used in producing a unit of U equals
C ,Jo'fs)a (s) ds, which, after some substitution using (14), (16), (1.6) and (1.8), yields (18) in
the text.
' That is, in equations (1 .3)'-(l.5)' one substitutes if fort and TI.
52TI ￿ if, substitute if fort and fl
33IX APPENDIX 2: V(N(t),t') =LT(T,p,g)
This appendix derives the explicit formula for V(N(t),t). Using (14)-(16) we know that the
flow of profits of any firm s such that a(s)￿a(Z) equals:
(2.1)
Substituting for I Cl and ), using (1.7) and (1.8), yields:




For a firm s invented at time 0 (i.e. s=N(0)), s —T=i —gtuntil such time as t= ill:,after
which T —s =— t, untilsuch time as I= i/g+tlg;after which the firm earns zero profits.
The steady state value of firm N(t) equals the present discounted value of its future profits:







Since LM =EL/g(r),it follows that V(N(t),,) =LMT(Tl,p,g), where:
'vs 'Vs+'g 2
25T
(ee'1')2e1' d:+ (e—e"")e' d:}
(.,p,g)—
34In the preceeding I have assumed that If , >then:




e"' represents the discount term for the time the firm must wait until it begins to
earn profits.
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